03 Nov 2025
In less than three decades, Tunisia has passed from being an autocratic regime to be a democratising country completing two electoral cycles and, after 2021, a post-coup autocracy again. Researching political participation in this mutable context reveals how people participate in formal and informal political activities (from voting to protesting) and why, and how they relate to institutions.
Two macro-findings emerge from our preliminary analysis of the Arab Barometer data:
The first is the primacy of socio-economic factors to drive political participation. In line with Teti et al. (2019)1, among others, we found a positive correlation between participation and respondents’ solid economic background. In particular, respondents who are more likely to participate in political activities are adult, hold a university degree, and tend to be men. Across the different waves of the Arab Barometer, from 2011 onwards, we found that, through these factors, one can predict more intense participation.
Yet, at a closer look, some of such predictors work differently across the population. In particular, the gender of respondents becomes less relevant for predicting political participation among younger respondents. This seems to indicate a reduced gender gap and a stronger women’s political empowerment among them. Moreover, younger generations are more likely to engage in formal and informal political activities alike, while older cohorts are generally more likely to participate in the vote rather than protests, marches and “street politics”.
The second macro-finding is the impact of Kais Saied’s 2019 presidential election and 2021 political coup on vote participation and the factors motivating Tunisians to vote. Saied’s appearance on the political scene in 2019 coincided with a steady decrease in the turnout at the ballot box.
While, in 2014, 67% and 63% of voters participated in the parliamentary and presidential elections respectively, the percentage was as low as 11% and 28% in the 2022 parliamentary and 2024 presidential elections respectively. Additionally, looking at the votes casted in 2022 and 2024, Tunisians seem to have moved away from a vote driven by polarisation.
While in past elections the religious-secular cleavage, and consequent polarisation, were relevant to incite electoral participation (Ozen et al. 2022)2, in post-Covid and post-coup Tunisia voters seem to have a different set of motivations to express through the vote their judgment of the new institutional asset, for which they have mixed feelings. The coup, in fact, created a strong-man executive leadership, built upon the vilification of the democratic check-and-balance system and the Parliament, which Saied suspended between 2021 and 2023 – a move that enjoyed popular support. This complex picture translates into interesting opinion data.
While 65% of respondents think that democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government, only 38% think that liberal democracy is suitable for their country. This figure worsens when it comes to the youth. Only 31% of the respondents between 18 and 29 years of age think that liberal democracy is a good fit for Tunisia. This scenario is in line with electoral participation. In an interesting twist, 43% of those declaring to have voted in the 2019 parliamentary elections do not trust the Parliament, which symbolises the cradle of democracy. This contradicts the literature, which establishes that trust in political institutions and participation in voting are positively correlated.
Considering the complexity it highlights, Tunisia is revelatory of the trends affecting and influencing political participation and institutional trust in turbulent times, echoing similarly complex situations in other countries characterised by populism and democratic backsliding.
Authors: Paola Rivetti and Valeria Resta, Dublin City University
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